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fix: implement vault key decryption on login + fix token refresh via cookie

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Three bugs fixed:

1. Phase 30 (auth.ts): After SRP login the encrypted_key_set was returned
   from the server but the vault key and RSA private key were never unwrapped
   with the AUK. keyStore.getVaultKey() was always null, causing Tier 1
   config-backup diffs to crash with a TypeError.
   Fix: unwrap vault key and private key using crypto.subtle.unwrapKey after
   successful SRP verification. Non-fatal: warns to console if decryption
   fails so login always succeeds.

2. Token refresh (auth.py): The /refresh endpoint required refresh_token in
   the request body, but the frontend never stored or sent it. After the 15-
   minute access token TTL, all authenticated API calls would fail silently
   because the interceptor sent an empty body and received 422 (not 401),
   so the retry loop never fired.
   Fix: login/srpVerify now set an httpOnly refresh_token cookie scoped to
   /api/auth/refresh. The refresh endpoint now accepts the token from either
   cookie (preferred) or body (legacy). Logout clears both cookies.
   RefreshRequest.refresh_token is now Optional to allow empty-body calls.

3. Silent token rotation: the /refresh endpoint now also rotates the refresh
   token cookie on each use (issues a fresh token), reducing the window for
   stolen refresh token replay.
This commit is contained in:
Cog
2026-03-11 21:56:08 -05:00
committed by Jason Staack
parent d0548bec86
commit 57e754bb27
3 changed files with 98 additions and 7 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

38
frontend/src/lib/auth.ts
View File

@@ -145,7 +145,43 @@ export const useAuth = create<AuthState>((set, get) => ({
// 8. Store AUK and unlock key set
keyStore.setAUK(auk)
// TODO (Phase 30): Decrypt encrypted_key_set with AUK to get vault key
// Decrypt encrypted_key_set with AUK to get vault key + RSA private key.
// Non-fatal: if decryption fails (e.g. corrupted key set, wrong AUK) we log
// a warning and continue. Server-side Transit encryption still works; only
// Tier 1 (client-side) encrypted data will be inaccessible until re-auth.
if (result.encrypted_key_set) {
const ks = result.encrypted_key_set
try {
const b64 = (s: string) => Uint8Array.from(atob(s), (c) => c.charCodeAt(0))
// Unwrap vault key (AES-256-GCM) using AUK
const vaultKey = await crypto.subtle.unwrapKey(
'raw',
b64(ks.encrypted_vault_key),
auk,
{ name: 'AES-GCM', iv: b64(ks.vault_key_nonce) },
{ name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },
false, // non-extractable
['encrypt', 'decrypt'],
)
keyStore.setVaultKey(vaultKey)
// Unwrap RSA-OAEP private key using AUK
const privateKey = await crypto.subtle.unwrapKey(
'pkcs8',
b64(ks.encrypted_private_key),
auk,
{ name: 'AES-GCM', iv: b64(ks.private_key_nonce) },
{ name: 'RSA-OAEP', hash: 'SHA-256' },
false, // non-extractable
['decrypt'],
)
keyStore.setPrivateKey(privateKey)
} catch (e) {
console.warn('[auth] key set decryption failed (Tier 1 data will be inaccessible):', e)
}
}
// 9. Store Secret Key in IndexedDB for future logins on this device
await keyStore.storeSecretKey(email, secretKeyBytes)